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Introduction
The Friedman rule states that optimal monetary policy in the long run requires de ‡ation at the real rate of interest. More recent work by Khan et al (2003) uses a richer model in which in ‡ation or de ‡ation has costs arising from price dispersion. They …nd the optimal rate of in ‡ation to be higher than the Friedman rule, but still negative. Nevertheless policymakers have chosen positive in ‡ation targets based on other criteria.
The central result of this paper is that, if households have hyperbolic discounting and there are multi-period nominal wage contracts, low positive in ‡ation rates can be optimal. Our baseline calibration implies an optimal rate of 2:1%, and we show that small positive rates between 1% and 4% are optimal over a wide range of calibrations.
To understand intuitively why hyperbolic discounting has this e¤ect, it is important to realize that in ‡ation redistributes the costs and bene…ts of employment through time. In particular, since a worker's nominal wage is constant over the wage contract period while the price level rises continually, the real wage falls over this contract period. Thus the worker's disutility of labour is distributed from the present (when the real wage is relatively high and working hours corresponding low) to the future (when the wage is low and working hours are high). Under hyperbolic discounting the future receives much less weight than the present. Since the worker attaches relatively little importance to the future disutility of labour, she is inclined to set a wage which implies a higher average level of labour over the contract period.
The greater the in ‡ation rate, the more the disutility of labour is shifted into the future. Thus the myopia inherent in hyperbolic discounting has a stronger e¤ect, and so aggregate employment rises: there is a long-run positive relation between in ‡ation and employment. This relation can provide a useful long-run role for monetary policy. Speci…cally, under imperfect competition and other market imperfections (such as income taxes), the equilibrium level of output and employment is ine¢ ciently low. But by letting the money supply grow and thereby generating in ‡ation, the monetary authority can stimulate long-run macroeconomic activity, thereby o¤setting the imperfections. It turns out that, on this account, 1 the optimal long-run in ‡ation rate becomes positive.
For a positive rate of in ‡ation to be optimal two conditions must be satis…ed.
1. The zero-in ‡ation steady state must be ine¢ cient. In our model this arises from two sources: imperfect competition among …rms and a labour income tax. It is this ine¢ ciency which monetary policy can potentially address.
2. There exists, at least over some range of in ‡ation above zero, a positive tradeo¤ between in ‡ation and real macroeconomic activity, such as production or employment. There are a number of possible theoretical justi…ca-tions for the existence of such a tradeo¤, among them are downward nominal wage rigidities; "greasing the wheels" of the labour market; the optimality of seigniorage when only distortionary taxes are available and the zero-lower bound on nominal interest rates. Reviews can be found in Sinclair (2003) or Billi and Khan (2008) 1 . In this paper we focus on the role of discounting.
Conventional New Keynesian models take account of the …rst condition (through their assumption that prices and/or wages are set under monopolistic competition), but not the second. The fact that discounting leads to a positive trade o¤ is well known in the literature (Romer, 1990; Ascari, 1998; Snower, 2004, Levin and Yun, 2007) .
Yet with exponential discounting, the discount rate is close to zero and this positive tradeo¤ is very small and only exists over a very small range of in ‡ation. In short, macroeconomic activity is ine¢ ciently low, but monetary policy is virtually powerless to do anything to raise it.
We show that the second condition becomes important under hyperbolic discounting, whereby households have a strong preference for a payo¤ today over a payo¤ tomorrow, but a much weaker preference for a payo¤ in a year's time over a payo¤ in a year and a day's time (Laibson, 1997 , Barro 1999 . 2 The optimal rate of in ‡ation is a function of the relative strengths of the different channels by which in ‡ation a¤ects real activity. In this paper, we present a simple New Keynesian model with households who choose between consuming goods by paying cash, which is subject to the in ‡ation tax, or credit, which incurs a time cost. Households supply di¤erentiated labour to …rms who face a production function involving a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of labour types. Households set nominal wages by means of Taylor contracts 3 .
In this model there are …ve channels (described in detail in Section 4) by which in ‡ation a¤ects real variables. The …rst two of these channels are sources of the in ‡ation tax: (i) "the wedge of monetary ine¢ ciency" (the part of the in ‡ation tax due to interest foregone on cash held) and (ii) "shopping time" (in ‡ation raises the nominal interest rate and thereby induces households to substitute credit for cash, thereby incurring a shopping time cost). These imply a negative relation between welfare and the rate of in ‡ation. If only these two channels are present, the Friedman rule applies and optimal monetary policy is to de ‡ate at the real rate of interest.
In the presence of in ‡ation, nominal wage contracts imply relative price instability in the form of wage dispersion. The third and fourth channels represent the e¤ect of this wage dispersion on …rms and households, respectively: (iii) "employment cycling" (in ‡ation generates ine¢ cient employment ‡uctuations due to ‡uctuations in households'real wages, in the presence of staggered nominal wage contracts) and (iv) "labour supply smoothing" (the employment ‡uctuations make households worse o¤, due to rising disutility of labour). These channels imply a negative relation between welfare and the absolute value of in ‡ation. Considering only these two channels, the optimal in ‡ation rate is zero: Thus in a model with the …rst four channels the optimal in ‡ation rate will lie between zero and the Friedman rule. This is e¤ectively the model of Khan et al (2003) .
The …nal channel is (v) "discounting" (a higher discount rate leads households' attaching less weight to the disutility from future work and, given a rising pro…le of labour over the wage contract, leads households to set a lower wage which means they supply more labour). As we noted above, discounting leads to a positive relation between in ‡ation and output and employment. However the welfare ef-3 Another possibiliy would be Calvo contracts. We discuss our choice in section 6.1. 3 fects of this are theoretically ambiguous as increased output increases welfare but increased employment reduces welfare. In this paper we show that, under our baseline calibration, while optimal in ‡ation without discounting is 1:2% (corresponding to Khan et al's, 2003 result) , if we introduce hyperbolic discounting the optimal rate becomes 2:1%.
Our result relies crucially on the interaction of nominal wage contracts and hyperbolic discounting. There is considerable empirical support for both of these features of the economy. For a review of the literature on hyperbolic discounting, see Laibson, 1997 . We review the evidence for the existence of nominal wage contracts in section 6.2 .
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 explains the …ve channels by which in ‡ation a¤ects real activity in the model. Section 4 gives our choice of parameters. Section 5 presents our benchmark result, explains the contribution of each of the …ve channels and conducts sensitivity analysis. In section 6 we discuss the our assumptions on the nature of the wage contract, and draw some implications for monetary policy. Section 7 concludes. The Appendix contains the solution of the household's problem and further derivations are available from the corresponding author's website.
Model
We present a simple dynamic general equilibrium model consisting of three types of agent: households, …rms and a government. There is no uncertainty, and in our results section we focus on steady states of the model.
A large number S of households supply di¤erentiated labour to …rms and consume goods. Households can choose whether to purchase goods with cash or with nominal credit, which incurs a time cost. In the spirit of Taylor (1979) , we group households into N wage-setting cohorts of equal size, each of which sets a nominal wage contract for N periods. Di¤erent cohorts set wages at di¤erent times, uniformly staggered.
Firms use all labour types to produce a homogeneous consumption good. The government imposes a tax on labour income, prints money and rebates the proceeds to households as a lump sum. 
Firms
The representative …rm uses all types of labour in a production function with a constant elasticity of substitution (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977) to produce a homogenous consumption good:
where y t is output, n t (h) is the amount of labour hired from household h, and is the elasticity of substitution between di¤erent labour types.
There is perfect competition in the product market. The …rm's cost-minimization implies a standard demand function for each household's labour:
where w (h) is the real value of the nominal wage set by household h. Note that since …rms are perfect competitors their markup will be zero and the real wage index constant and equal to unity.
Households
A typical household h maximizes its lifetime utility de…ned over consumption c and leisure l
We write the discount factor between periods t and t + i in the general form t:t+i to allow di¤erent speci…cations.
In what follows we restrict ourselves to utility functions of the following form
Households maximize their utility subject to a budget constraint, written in real terms as
where m is real money balances, d is credit used to buy goods, are lump-sum transfers from government, and n is time spent working. R and , the nominal rate of interest and the in ‡ation rate respectively, we assume to be constant 4 .
Holdings of one-period nominal bonds, which pay a unit on redemption, are given by b.
Households face a choice between buying goods with cash, and buying them with nominal credit. If the proportion of goods bought with credit is , the household's holdings of real money balances are given by
and holdings of nominal consumption debt, repayable in the next period, are
To model the split between cash and credit goods, we follow Khan et al (2003) by assuming that buying goods with credit involves a cost in terms of "shopping time", n s . Then if we normalize the total time endowment to unity, the household's time constraint is
We follow Khan et al (2003) in interpreting the single consumption good as a continuum of goods, and modeling the cash / credit split by assuming that if credit is used, the purchase involves a random …xed time cost $ which is only known after the consumer has chosen how much of the good to buy, but before the decision to buy it with cash or credit. If F is the cumulative distribution function 4 Since our results will relate only to steady states there is no loss of generality here 6 of time costs, total time costs borne by household h are then
The household also faces the downward sloping demand curves for the household's labour type (2) and the constraint that it can only change its wage every N periods.
Government
Government revenue arises from a proportional tax on labour income and from seigniorage. There is no government spending and proceeds are rebated to households equally by lump-sum transfers , so that the government budget constraint is
The government follows an exogenous rule for the money supply with a constant growth rate g and this gives steady state in ‡ation, = m = g.
Aggregates
In the absence of government spending, the aggregate budget constraint is
We de…ne aggregate labour as
and the aggregate wage index in terms of e¢ ciency labour is
The real interest rate is given by
which is constant in a given steady state since R and are assumed constant.
Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium for the above economy is a sequence of plans for allocations of households such that 1. Given prices, the allocations solve the utility maximization problem. If preferences are time-inconsistent, the allocations are also Nash equilibria of the game-theoretic problem of each household.
2. fw t g t=1:1 is the marginal product of aggregate labour (12).
3. Product, money and bond markets clear.
Discounting
With exponential discounting, the household's discount factor is constant through time, t:t+i = i . To model hyperbolic discounting, we follow Laibson (1996 Laibson ( , 1997 and much of the subsequent literature, in approximating the hyperbolic discount function by a "quasi-hyperbolic" discount function in which the discount factors 5 (6) and (7) allow this to be written either in terms of money m and consumption debt holdings d or consumption c and the credit goods split 8 from the perspective of the current period are 1; ; 2 ; 3 ::::. The discount factor between the …rst two periods is ; but that between all subsequent periods is . Thus we can think of as a short-run discount factor, and as a long-run discount factor. In this case the household's behavior is time-inconsistent: in future periods the household will have an incentive to change plans made in the current period. Since the household cannot commit itself to a plan beyond the current period and since a household with rational expectations will take this into account when making its decisions, it is standard practice (e.g. Laibson, 1996) to formulate the household's problem as a game played by the household at time t (self t) against the household in future periods (future selves).
Solving the household' s problem
We show in Appendix A that the equilibrium strategy 6 of an in…nitely-lived household with preferences (3) facing constraints (2), (5) and (8) and able to reset its nominal wage every N periods is
where the real value of the nominal wage the household chooses when it can change its wage is
6 (2), (8) and (9) show that choosing a strategy in terms of the wage and the proportion of goods to buy with credit fw; g; is equivalent to choosing one in terms of the time to allocate to employment and shopping activities fn; n s g. On this account, l t (h) is not listed as an argument of the household's equilibrium strategy.
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The proportion of credit goods is de…ned implicitly by
and consumption is a constant fraction of a t the household's lifetime wealth,
This di¤ers from the standard permanent income result that consumption is the annuity value of wealth, ra (h), due to the distortionary e¤ects of in ‡ation, equivalent to a proportional tax on consumption, discussed in section 3.5. Comparing (17) and (18) with the equivalent equations (34) and (35) in Khan et al (2003) shows that the equilibrium strategy is of the same form as the optimal choice in a time-consistent world.
The steady state
For the remainder of the paper we consider the properties of a symmetric steady state in which all households consume the same amount in all periods 7 and, when they can reset their wage, choose a nominal wage to obtain the same real wage. Households set nominal wages every N periods. Since contracts are set in staggered fashion, under non-zero in ‡ation the N di¤erent cohorts charge N di¤erent real wages (the highest charged by the cohort which sets its wage this period; the lowest charged by the cohort which set its wage N 1 periods ago). In short, the economy is characterized by real wage dispersion.
An important feature of this steady state is that the intertemporal distribution of real wages across the contract period is identical to the intratemporal distribution of wages between cohorts. This can be seen from a simple example involving N = 4 with four cohorts setting wage contracts lasting four periods. Whenever a cohort resets its wage, it chooses a nominal wage to give a real wage w . In the next period, the real value of this is w 1+
, and so on. Table 1a and b show the resulting nominal and real wage distributions. 
In the face of this non-smooth path of income, households exchange bonds to smooth their consumption 8 , and all households consume the same amount in every
where n i is the labour supplied by a typical household in the ith period of its contract. The equation for the aggregate wage index (13) implies that when households can reset their nominal wage they choose it so that its real value is
Combining (16) and (19) then using the government's budget constraint (10) to eliminate transfers gives a labour supply relation 9 :
This sets the present value of the marginal disutility of labour with respect to the wage (on the left-hand side) equal to the present value of the marginal utility of the extra consumption resulting from a higher wage (on the right-hand side). Due to consumption smoothing, the right-hand side is independent of the wage since an increase in the wage leads to an increase in consumption from (19) and thus a fall in its marginal utility which, with log utility, exactly o¤sets the increase in income resulting from the higher wage.
Given an in ‡ation rate , we can use (20) to solve for the real equivalent w of the nominal reset wage. Given a level of aggregate labour, (2) then gives the path of labour across the contract period. Exploiting the symmetry between the intratemporal and intertemporal properties of the model, we can then calculate consumption c from (18) and obtain the proportion of credit goods from (17) and the allocation between labour n, shopping time n s and leisure l from (8) and (9). We then iterate on the quantity of aggregate labour until (21) is satis…ed.
3 Five channels by which in ‡ation a¤ects real activity
In our model there are …ve channels by which the rate of in ‡ation (equal to the rate of money growth in the steady state) a¤ects real activity. In this section we describe each of these channels in turn.
Employment cycling
The real wage dispersion arising from staggered contracts means that, given the form of the production function (1), …rms substitute towards the labour of relatively cheap households and away from relatively expensive households. This is ine¢ cient in the sense that for a given level of aggregate labour, the higher the degree of real wage dispersion, the lower will be the level of output. Thus real wage dispersion leads to a negative relation between the absolute value of in ‡ation and real variables. This e¤ect is familiar in the new Keynesian literature on optimal monetary policy. For Woodford (2003, sect 2.1, p393) cycling between di¤erent types of labour is the key distortion which leads to a stabilizing role for monetary policy.
Labour supply smoothing
With strictly concave preferences over leisure ( > 0), the ‡uctuations in hours arising from employment cycling makes households worse o¤. In response, they supply less labour at a given wage over the contract period. This leads to a negative relation between the absolute value of in ‡ation and real variables.
Discounting
When choosing their wage, households compare the present value (over the contract period) of the marginal disutility of labour (M DL) with the present value of the marginal utility of consumption (M U C). Since the latter is constant due to consumption smoothing and, under positive in ‡ation, the former is rising, an increase in the discount factor means that the M DL falls by more than the M U C so, other things being equal, the household will set a lower wage which means it supplies more labour. Working through the steps in detail:
1. Households set their wage so that the present value (over the contract period) of the marginal disutility of labour with respect to the wage is equal to the present value of the marginal utility of consumption from the labour income generated by a wage change. This is the labour supply relation (21).
2. When in ‡ation is positive, labour supply increases over the contract period because of employment cycling and thus the M DL increases over the contract period. By contrast, the M U C remains constant through time, since consumption is constant, given by (19).
3. Due to discounting, future marginal utilities and disutilities receive less weight than current ones. Since the M DL increases over the contract period whereas the M U C remains constant, an increase in discounting reduces the present value of the M DL relative to the present value of the M U C. In response, the household sets a lower wage that raises its labour supply, thereby raising the present value of the M DL to bring the two present values back into equality. So, given in ‡ation, as the discount rate increases, labour supply increases.
4. An increase in in ‡ation means employment cycling gets stronger so the M DL increases more over the contract period and the more the discounting e¤ect reduces the present value of the M DL relative to the present value of the M U C. Consequently the household sets a wage that increases its labour supply to bring the two present values back into equality. So, given discounting, as the in ‡ation rate increases, labour supply increases.
Shopping time
As in ‡ation rises, and hence the nominal interest rate rises as well, households optimally substitute away from cash and towards credit goods as given by (17). This involves direct costs in terms of shopping time given by (9). The time constraint (8) then means less time is available for market activities so this generates a negative relation between the level of in ‡ation and real activity.
Wedge of monetary ine¢ ciency
The in ‡ation tax raises the cost of consumption of cash goods, and we de…ne the wedge of monetary ine¢ ciency, following Khan et al (2003) as the di¤erence between the actual cost of consumption and the cost when the nominal interest rate is zero. From inspection of (18) this wedge is equal to R (1 t ), the product of the nominal interest rate and the proportion of cash goods in consumption (1 ). In other words, steady state in ‡ation acts as a proportional tax on consumption, with the tax rate being R (1 t ). This generates a negative relation between in ‡ation and real activity. Table 2 compares the e¤ects of …ve channels on real activity 10 . 
Comparison
Labour supply smoothing # "
Wedge of monetary ine¢ ciency # #
Choice of parameters
We choose a benchmark set of parameters, shown in table 3, to allow us to explore the determinants of the optimal in ‡ation rate in our model. We perform sensitivity analysis to all the important parameters in section 5.3 below. 
Wage setting
We take the length of a contract to be one year, following Taylor (1999) , and assume it remains constant as in ‡ation varies. We discuss the empirical rationale for this in section 6.2.
Period of Analysis
In our model the period of analysis is important for two reasons. Firstly, it determines the time over which the high short-run discount factor applies and so the strength of the discounting e¤ect -this is discussed in the next subsection Secondly, it a¤ects average money balances and so the importance of the in ‡ation tax. We choose a period of analysis of one month, and this, along with our assumption of a contract length of one year implies that there are twelve wage setting cohorts N = 12.
Preferences
We have already restricted household's utility functions (4) to be separable in consumption and leisure implying logarithmic preferences over consumption, and we further choose logarithmic preferences over leisure, = 1. The weight on leisure in the utility function, , is chosen so that households spend 20% of their time working (standard in the RBC literature).
In appendix A.8 we show that the three time preference parameters ; and r are related by
so given our calibration of the real interest rate we only need to pick one of the discounting parameters. The choice of , the parameter measuring the size of short-run subjective discounting, is more di¢ cult. Values of between 60% and 70% are standard in the hyperbolic discounting literature, for example Laibson et al (2007) , but applying to annual data. There are some attempts to estimate quasi-hyperbolic discount functions over shorter time horizons, all using the pattern of consumption between paydays. Shapiro (2005) …nds a daily discount factor of around 90%; Hu¤man and Barenstein (2005) …nd a range from 87% to 97%; Mastrobuoni and Weinberg (2009) obtain broadly similar results. Note that these studies are incompatible with Laibson's work since they imply an annual discount factor much higher than 70%. There are also a number of serious methodological issues in comparing di¤erent studies 11 .
The only survey we are aware of is Fredrick et al (2002) . Their …ndings on the short-run discount factor, in their table 1a, suggest that it is somewhere between 0% and 80%. Given the lack of a consensus, we choose = 70% for our baseline calibration. This choices implies via (22) a value for the long-run discount parameter of 0:998. So our calibration is broadly compatible with Laibson's since our annual discount factor will be 11
68%.
A further choice is whether the period of analysis should be the same as the period over which the high short-run discount factor applies. Making the period of analysis longer than the period of high discounting would have no great e¤ect. Making it shorter would involve an extra parameter and would require assumptions about how to "compound down" the short-run discount factor. In the absence of any empirical guidance on these issues we choose to keep the period of analysis the same as the period over which the short-run discount factor applies i.e. the "kink" in the quasi-hyperbolic discount function is after one period.
Money demand
Demand for real balances in our model is given by m t = (1 t ) c t and , the proportion of credit goods, depends on the distribution of costs via (17). Since we take our model of credit goods from Khan et al (2003) , we can also use their 11 One issue is that discounting would be expected to vary across groups in society. Since the di¤erenst studies use di¤erent data sets, they may be measuring the discounting of di¤erent groups. In the current paper we describe the behaviour of wage setters who will be present in di¤erent data sets to di¤erent extents.
Another issue is that discounting parameters are estimated jointly with the intertemporal elastically of consumption and also depend on other assumptions such as the extent of credit constraints.
estimates for the form of the cost distribution function F . They posit that F has a generalized beta distribution
where B is the beta distribution, and then use US data to estimate the …ve parameters, L ; H ; ; b 1 ; b 2 , based on two data sets, a "short sample" starting in 1959 and a "long sample" starting in 1948 12 . For our benchmark calibration, we use the short sample estimates and report results for the long sample estimates in our sensitivities section.
Other parameters
For the elasticity of labour substitution, , we choose a value of 5. 13 We set the level of labour taxation to be 35%, corresponding roughly to the average for the OECD, see Mendoza et al (1994) .
The zero-in ‡ation steady state
At zero in ‡ation, there are no relative price distortions since the real wage is constant over the contract period. Given the above choice of parameters, households buy 65% of goods with credit, and hence the ratio of money balances to consumption is 35%. Households spend 0:003% of their time endowment shopping. This is similar to the value in Khan et al (2003) and is consonant with the observation by Lucas (2000) that households spend "several hours per year" avoiding the in ‡ation tax.
5 The optimal rate of in ‡ation selves will not necessarily agree on rankings of utility ‡ows (see ·  Imrohoro¼ glu et al., 2003) . One approach is to de…ne social welfare as a sum of the utility of all selves at all points in time, choosing a backward discount factor to measure how a self at some particular time values utility ‡ows at earlier times. The choice of a backward discount factor is complex (see · Imrohoro¼ glu et al., 2003 and Caplin and Leahy, 2004 ) but assuming it is between 0 and 1 (i.e. utility in the past is valued less than utility today) Appendix B.4 shows that the social welfare function, de…ned as the sum of the utility of all N selves in all N contracts is proportional to
where the constant of proportionality is a function of the backward discount factor and the steady state rate of interest i.e. it is independent of all the parameters we will vary. Output and hence consumption in the zero-in ‡ation steady state are below the …rst best due to the presence of distorting labour taxes and imperfect competition. This means that if there is a positive trade o¤ between real variables and in ‡ation at least in some range from zero in ‡ation upwards, the monetary policymaker can potentially improve social welfare by choosing higher in ‡ation.
Given our choice of parameters, the annual in ‡ation rate that maximizes social welfare is 2:1%. In the next two sections we explain the role of the …ve channels in this result, and show how it depends on our choice of parameters.
Selectively removing channels
How much do each of the …ve channels by which in ‡ation a¤ects real variables (described in section 3) contribute to our benchmark result? Table 4 reports the e¤ect of selectively eliminating combinations of the channels 14 .
14 We eliminate the discount e¤ect by setting t:t+i = 1 for all t; i; labour supply smoothing by setting = 0; the wedge by setting R (1 ) to zero in the labour supply equation; shopping time by forcing n s t = 0; employment cycling by forcing n to be constant over the contract period at its calibrated value. Discounting is the only one of the …ve channels which leads to a positive relation between in ‡ation and real activity, and eliminating it means that de ‡ation becomes optimal. This mirrors the result of Khan et al (2003) that, in the absence of discounting, the other channels imply that mild de ‡ation is optimal (Khan et al's, 2003 equivalent optimal rate is 0:76%).
Shopping time and the wedge of monetary ine¢ ciency represent the e¤ects of the in ‡ation tax in terms of shopping time and the cost of consumption respectively. Eliminating either of these therefore will raise the optimal in ‡ation rate, and lines 2 and 3 of the table show this. If both of these e¤ects and discounting are eliminated, the only channels that remain are employment cycling and labour supply smoothing. Both of these imply a negative relation between the absolute value of in ‡ation and real variables: hence taken on their own they imply that zero in ‡ation is optimal, line 4 of the table.
If we eliminate the e¤ects of relative price instability by "switching o¤" employment cycling, the only e¤ects of in ‡ation would be shopping time and the wedge of monetary ine¢ ciency. Setting the nominal interest rate to zero eliminates both of these (as can be seen from inspection of (17) and (21)) so the Friedman rule is optimal. With R = 0; the Fisher relation implies 1 + = (1 + r) 1 and given our choice of r = 4% this means = 3:9% 20
Monetary policy and ine¢ ciency
The level of optimal in ‡ation will depend on the degree to which the steady state is ine¢ cient. In our model the zero-in ‡ation steady state is ine¢ cient due to imperfect competition in the labour market and the tax on labour income and we can demonstrate the following striking result: the greater the ine¢ ciency in our economy -so that the lower is steady-state output relative to optimal output -then the greater is the optimal in ‡ation rate. In short, the optimal in ‡ation rate is not independent of the degree of economic ine¢ ciency. On the contrary, the optimal in ‡ation rate is positive because it can compensate for an ine¢ cient steady state level of real activity. The degree of imperfect competition is given by the parameter which represents the level of market power of a particular labour type. From (1), the higher is , the more substitutable are labour types, so the lower is market power. If we weaken the degree of imperfect competition by raising from the baseline of 5 to a value of 7, the optimal rate of in ‡ation falls to 1:8%. Similarly, if we increase the degree of imperfect competition by choosing = 3, the optimal rate of in ‡ation increases to 2:3%.
The proportional labour income tax is a rate , chosen to be 35% in our baseline calibration. Reducing the tax rate to 25%, thus making the steady state less ine¢ cient reduces the optimal rate of in ‡ation to 1:7%. Increasing the tax rate to 45% increases the optimal in ‡ation rate to 2:6%.
This result has wide-ranging implications and we discuss some of these in section 6.3 below.
Sensitivity analysis
In this section we describe how variations in other model parameters a¤ect the optimal rate of in ‡ation. Although there is a large degree of uncertainty about many of the parameters of our model, this section shows that our main result, that a positive rate of in ‡ation is optimal, is robust to variations in our benchmark calibration. Table 5 shows how the optimal rate of in ‡ation varies with these the short-run discount factor and the period of analysis 15 . We choose short-run discount factors ranging from 60% to 95%, and a period of analysis from semi-annual to weekly (semi-annual contracts are the longest that are compatible with overlapping wage contracts a year in length). Looking along the rows we see that the higher the short-run discount factor, the greater the optimal rate of in ‡ation. In order for optimal in ‡ation to be positive when equilibrium output is ine¢ ciently low, there must be a positive relation between in ‡ation and real economic activity. The only channel in our model which leads to such a positive relation is discounting. The more heavily households discount the short-term future, the greater the positive e¤ect of in ‡ation on real economic activity and thus the greater is the optimal in ‡ation rate. Note that the macroeconomic literature on hyperbolic discounting typically uses values in the …rst three columns of the table. Our baseline calibration takes the period of analysis to be a month. In standard models, the period of analysis has small e¤ects, if any. In contrast, in our model the period has two o¤setting e¤ects. Firstly, the longer the period of analysis, the greater the real money balances that households hold, other things being equal, and thus the greater is the e¤ect of the in ‡ation tax and the lower is the optimal rate of in ‡ation. Secondly, the period of analysis is also the length of time for which the high short-run discount rate applies and tends to strengthen the discounting e¤ect and thus raises the optimal rate of in ‡ation. The table shows that the …rst e¤ect dominates when discounting is weak; and the second when discounting is strong.
Discounting and period of analysis

Shopping Time
The properties of shopping time and the monetary wedge are largely determined by the estimates of the shopping time function which we take from Khan et al (2003) . They present two sets of estimates, one based on a short sample period and the other on a longer sample. In our base calibration we use the former. If instead we use the latter, the optimal in ‡ation rate becomes 2:6%. Although the optimal rate doesn't change much, the relative magnitude of the e¤ects of the monetary wedge and shopping time changes considerably. 
Labour supply elasticity
As the elasticity of labour supply falls ( increases), households become more averse to non-smooth paths of labour so the positive trade-o¤ between output and in ‡ation weakens and optimal rate of in ‡ation falls. This e¤ect is shown in table  6 17 . 
Summary
As discussed in section 4, there is a large degree of uncertainty over all the important parameters of the model, both in terms of their measurement and of mapping what is a very stylised model onto the world. However this section has shown that our result of a positive optimal rate of in ‡ation is robust to plausible variations in the parameters with the exception of the discount factor. This reemphasizes the importance of discounting as the only channel which leads to a positive relation between in ‡ation and real variables.
Discussion
Calvo contracts
Calvo contracts are common in standard new Keynesian models which are linearized around a zero in ‡ation rate. However they give anomalous results in models with non-zero steady state in ‡ation. The problem is as follows. Calvo contracts imply that, if there are a large number of households, some of them never reset their nominal wage. With positive steady state in ‡ation, this means the real wage of such households falls to zero. Given the simple CES form of …rms' production function (1), …rms substitute completely to these wage setters meaning production falls towards zero. Bakshi et al (2003) address this issue more formally and show that Calvo contracts imply a maximum rate of steady state in ‡ation that can be analyzed -given their calibration, this maximum value is 5:5% -and that they distort the steady state for any value of in ‡ation substantially di¤erent from zero.
The absence of indexation
A key assumption of our analysis are that wages are set annually in nominal terms, and that within this contract period of one year there is no indexation. In this assumption we follow Khan et al (2003) who specify a more complex process of price adjustment than us but still assume that it is exogenous. In this section we review the evidence for this. When thinking about the nature of wage contracts it is important to distinguish between unionized and non-unionized workers. Taylor (1999) , reviewing the direct empirical evidence for the unionized sector in the US, cites a large number of studies that suggests that annual contracts are the most common length of wage setting interval. The wide variation across countries is captured by Groth and Johansson (2004) who update the study of Bruno and Sachs (1985) with data from 1985 -1995. They assign countries an index which takes a value of 0 if the average length of union contract is a year or less, 1 if it is from 1 -3 years and 2 if it is greater than 3 years. The mean of this index across OECD countries was 0.94 for 1985 -1995, suggesting a mean contract length greater than a year.
There is much less evidence on the non-unionized sector, partly because the most common source of data are panel data sets (the PSID for the US, or the BHPS for the UK) which typically collect their data annually so necessarily miss any sub-annual wage setting. However there does seem to be a consensus in the literature that most wages are set annually. For example, for the US, Taylor (1999) writes, "setting nominal wages at a …xed level for more than several quarters and usually for as long as a year appears to be just as prevalent for workers who are not in unions, or do not have formal employment contracts, as for union workers with employment contracts". Smith (2000) , referring to the UK, notes that "pay negotiation in the United Kingdom typically occur at annual intervals, and pay awards are often made every 12 months even for workers who are not covered by collective bargaining" and Brown et al (2004) state that the annual wage settlement is "the principal source of pay change for most employees in Britain". This is consonant with estimates of the degree of wage stickiness (reviewed in Taylor, 1999) using aggregate data which typically …nd the average length of time between wage changes to be greater than one year.
Because we assume the length of nominal contracts is …xed at one year while we vary in ‡ation, our model is subject to a version of the Lucas critique. Wouldn't agents change their wage setting behaviour as steady state in ‡ation varies? So an important empirical question is the degree to which the contract period changes with steady state in ‡ation. Taylor (1999) writes that the average contract period fell to one year (our baseline value) during the great in ‡ation of the 1970s, when average in ‡ation was well above the range we consider in this paper. Looking across the OECD, Groth and Johansson (2004) …nd their index variable was 0.78 in the period 1975 -85, still consistent with an average contract length above a year, and rose to 0.94 in the next ten years when average in ‡ation was lower. So this suggests that modelling nominal contracts as …xed at one year over a range of in ‡ation from 0 -10% as we do in this paper is, if anything, a conservative assumption and we could expect contracts to be longer now that average in ‡ation is low.
Our assumption of Taylor contracts, without intra-contract indexation, instead of Fisher contracts, is similarly open to the Lucas critique. First note that our model of annual nominal contracts nests annual indexation since wages are opti-mally reset each year. Only indexation within the annual contract period would a¤ect our results. The empirical evidence on indexation is striking. Card (1986) , writing about a period when average in ‡ation was well over the top of the range we consider, notes that "perhaps no more than 10% of all US workers are covered by cost-of-living provisions". This surprising result arises because indexation is only observed in union contracts and, as Card (1983) reports, only in around 60% of these, and "escalation provisions are rare in the non-union sector". Further, while one can …nd evidence of quarterly cost of living (COLA) adjustments, the vast majority seem to be annual (Kaufman and Woglom, 1986, Vroman, 1985) . More recently, Christo…des and Leung (2003) , looking at Canadian data from 1976 -1999, write that "very few contracts contain COLA clauses". So while wage indexation is a feature of very high in ‡ation rates (Marinakis, 1997) , it seems largely absent over the range of in ‡ation we consider.
Monetary policymaking
While our model is very stylized, an implication of our analysis is that the structure of the economy -insofar as it a¤ects the degree of economic ine¢ ciency -should be a factor that in ‡uences policymakers'choice of an in ‡ation target. At present, in ‡ation targets are chosen to be around 2% largely on the grounds that such a rate is consistent with price stability (in the sense that in ‡ation of around 2% has little adverse impact on agents' decisions) and it is su¢ ciently positive to avoid the nominal rate hitting the zero-lower bound too often.
However our analysis suggests that the structure of the economy should also be taken into account when choosing an in ‡ation target. Speci…cally, the more ine¢ cient is equilibrium output and employment, the higher the in ‡ation target should be. This implies that in ‡ation targets should be re-evaluated over time as the structure of the real economy changes. It also has obvious implications for the analysis of optimum currency areas. Di¤erent countries in a currency union will in general have di¤erent degrees of steady-state ine¢ ciency, so the mechanism in this paper gives a new source of di¤erential welfare e¤ects across countries in addition to those discussed in, for example, Benigno (2004) .
We most certainly do not wish to argue that monetary policy should always compensate for ine¢ ciencies in labour and product markets. Usually policy makers can deal with these ine¢ ciencies more e¤ectively through the use of structural and …scal policies, e.g. policies that promote competition in product and labour markets, structural policies that reduce institutional rigidities, taxes and subsidies that overcome market failures in these markets. The reason is that the latter policies may reduce the ine¢ ciencies at lower cost than monetary policy. But for any given level of ine¢ ciency that remains once …scal and structural policies are at their optimal levels, monetary policy should not ignore the ine¢ ciencies that remain.
Conclusion
We have shown that the interaction between nominal contracts and hyperbolic discounting can lead to a tradeo¤ between in ‡ation and macroeconomic activity for which a small positive in ‡ation rate is optimal. In our baseline calibration, this rate is 2:1% and remains positive for a wide range of calibrations. Our analysis is meant to narrow the gulf between monetary theory and practice. Thus far, monetary theory has suggested that the optimal in ‡ation rate is negativebeginning with the Friedman rule and ranging to the more moderate, but still negative optimal in ‡ation of Khan et al. (2003) -but central bankers have never taken this seriously. Our analysis is a …rst step in reconciling the optimal in ‡ation literature with the practice of targeting small positive in ‡ation rates. The optimal in ‡ation rate in our model is a result of the relative magnitudes of …ve channels by which in ‡ation a¤ects real activity, and we have analyzed the e¤ects of these channels in our model: shopping time, the wedge of monetary ine¢ ciency, employment cycling, labour supply smoothing and discounting.
A general implication of our analysis is that the optimal rate of in ‡ation depends on the structure of the economy in two ways. Firstly via the degree of structural ine¢ ciency. We show that as the equilibrium becomes more ine¢ cient, due to higher labour taxes or more imperfect competition, the optimal in ‡ation rate rises. Secondly, via the mechanisms by which in ‡ation a¤ects real variables. An important topic for further research would be to examine a variety of di¤er-ent common ine¢ ciencies and examine whether they have similar implications for 27 monetary policy.
A Solving the household' s problem
Under hyperbolic discounting, the household's preferences are time inconsistent so standard dynamic programming techniques cannot be used. Instead, we model the household at time t as playing a game against its future selves. Throughout this appendix we are considering the problem of a single household so drop the (h) notation for brevity.
A.1 Preliminaries
A.1.1 Utility function
Household utility (4) is de…ned in terms of consumption c t and leisure l t . However leisure is determined by (i) the proportion of credit goods t and (ii) the wage w t which determines the …rm's labour demand. Use the time constraint (8) and the expressions for labour demand (2) and shopping time (9) to write leisure in terms of the choice variables
and use this to rewrite the utility function in terms of the choice variables (recall that y t is exogenous to the household's problem):
v (c t ; w t ; t ) = log c t + 1
A.1.2 Net assets
It will prove helpful to de…ne the consumption function in terms of net assets. This section reconciles this approach with the budget constraint (5), reproduced here:
1. Substitute for money and credit from (6) then subtract d t+1 from both sides using (7) to obtain
2. De…ne net assets as net bonds less credit, a t = b t d t 3. Assume at the start of time the household sells its lifetime income (which consists of labour income, transfers and the initial redistribution of wealth which is equivalent to spreading the household's income equally over the contract period 18 ) in exchange for bonds:
where z j is the discounted value of average contract income in the contract period starting in t = jN .5) and ' = 1 (1+r) N 1 (1+r)
1 .
Then assets evolve according to
A.2 The household' s problem V (a t ; w t ) = max [v (c t ; w t ; t ) + V (a t+1 ; w t+1 )] ; 0 t T (A.7) subject to asset evolution (A.6). v is as de…ned in (A.2). Continuation utility is
Note:
1. Time inconsistency means that actual utility from the perspective of the household at time t + 1 will be di¤erent from continuation utility since a di¤erent discount factor will be applied to the utility ‡ows. This is why standard dynamic programming techniques cannot be used.
2. Wages are set every N periods so w t is in general the wage prevailing at time t and not necessarily a choice variable in that period.
3. We do not allow the use of credit in the …nal period of the game.
The optimum strategy is found by backwards induction. The problem is …rst solved in the …nal period T , then in a general period 0 t < T .
A.3 The …nal period, t = T
In the …nal period we assume credit goods cannot be used (since the credit would never be repaid) so mN 1 = 0 and the household simply consumes the value of the remaining assets, which from (A.6) is
where T = 1 1+ .
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A.4 Other periods 0 t < T
The …rst-order conditions of the maximization problem given by (A.7) with respect to c t ; t and w t are
The …rst equation sets the marginal utility of consumption equal to its cost of in terms of reduced future utility. The second sets the marginal disutility of an increase in the proportion of credit goods (in terms of higher shopping time and hence reduced leisure) equal to the bene…t in terms of higher future consumption. The third sets the marginal bene…t of setting a higher wage (in terms of increased leisure in the current period) against the future marginal costs in terms of reduced future consumption (V a da t+1 dwt ) and reduced future leisure (V w ). Recall that since wage are only set every N periods the …rst-order condition for the wage is only valid for t = 0; N; 2N:::
A.5 The strategy for consumption Using the utility function (A.2)
Conjecture that the optimal strategy for consumption is of the form c t = t a t (A.14)
Di¤erentiate the asset evolution equation (A.6) to give
Combine these with the …rst-order condition for consumption (A.10) to give
Di¤erentiating continuation utility (A.8) and using (A.14)
The asset evolution equation (A.6) can be written .18) where
Substituting this into (A.17) A.25) where the …rst step uses (A.14) and the third uses (A.18).
So (A.16) becomes A.26) where = 1 (1 T t 1 ) Then using (A.14) .27) and using (A.19)
A.6 The strategy for the proportion of credit goods
Using the utility function (A.2)
Di¤erentiating the asset evolution equation (A.6)
Combining these with (A.16) and the …rst-order condition (A.11) gives .32) which de…nes implicitly the choice of t .
A.7 The strategy for the wage
Recall that the wage can only be chosen in periods t = 0; N; 2N:::. If we are in one of these periods the following analysis applies. Otherwise the wage is given.
Di¤erentiating continuation utility (A.8) gives
Assets in t + 1 depend on the wage chosen in this period via the initial sale of labour income in (A.4) so
Substituting this, (A.34) and (A.16) into the …rst-order condition for the wage (A.12) gives
Using the general discount factor ( t:t = 1 t:t+i = i for i > 0) the optimal choice of the wage can be written
A.8 An in…nite horizon game
As m ! 1 (recall T = mN ) the expression for (A.28) becomes
In the in…nite horizon game, if assets are neither to collapse or explode, and ruling out oscillatory solutions, from (A.18)
which implies from (A.19) .44) and equating this with (A.41) gives a relation between the three time preference parameters 1 = r (A.45)
A.9 Uniqueness
If t and w t were exogenous, (A.44) would give a unique value for t then (A.39) a unique value for w t . However in general (A.32) shows that t depends on itself both directly and via leisure. Geometrically, the left hand side of (A.32) is the 45 o line and since F is a CDF so de…ned at every value on the interval [0; 1] there will always be at least one solution. However since there is no closed form expression for consumption or output nothing general can be said about whether there might be more than one solution. Given this, the only option is to check uniqueness numerically for each steady state (each value of in ‡ation for each calibration) considered in the paper. This process is straightforward:
1. Take exogenous over a …ne grid and at each point of the grid evaluate the right-hand side of (A.32)
B Supplementary material B.1 The initial wealth distribution
In the absence of redistributive tax, di¤erent cohorts have (very slightly, under the range of in ‡ation rates we consider in the paper) di¤erent present values of lifetime wealth. This is because, if there are two cohorts, one starts their life in the …rst period of the contract when income is high, and the second starts in the second period of the contract when income is low, so the present value of labour income of the …rst is higher than that of the second. The di¤erences in wealth are small, but they make aggregation di¢ cult since they imply the optimal wage would di¤er between cohorts. So we consider a government that sets a pattern of initial endowments to make the wealth of households equal.
In the steady state, each contract period is identical, so writing the real wage as w i and labour supply in period i of a contract as n i the total ‡ow of income in period t is
so the total lifetime wealth of society is the annuity value of this:
Divide this equally between cohorts so
3)
The government redistributes wealth before the opening of the initial period to equalize each cohort's wealth at this value. Away from the steady state, and in …nite games of length mN , m 2 Z + , the government announces that it will set each cohort's wealth equal to 1 . This reduces to (B.3) for the steady state of an in…nite game. To make the steady state symmetric, households must take this redistribution into account when optimising.
B.2 Deriving the labour supply relation
In the steady state, the government's budget constraint is 
B.4 Deriving the social welfare function
We de…ne the social welfare function as a sum over all N selves in all N cohorts.
B.4.1 Utility from the perspective of selves at t=0
In the steady state, the only variation in instantaneous utility across households is according to which period of the wage contract they are in. so let u (0) be the utility of a household who set their wage in the current period, u (1) be the utility of a household who set their wage in the previous period and u (N 1) the utility of a household who set their wage N 1 periods ago. Then the lifetime utility of a household who reset their wage in the current period is If households "discount" past utility ‡ows by some constant factor < 1; at t = 1 the utility of the household who reset its wage in the previous period will be So social welfare, the sum over all N selves in all N cohorts, reduces to a sum of the utility of a representative household from each of the N cohorts.
